





§ 1. AT common law confidential communications made by
a client to his attorney, counsellor, or solicitor, in the course
of any professional employment, and relating to the subject
thereof, are protected, on grounds of public policy, and the
latter will not be permitted to testify to such communications,
unless the privilege is waived by the client. This rule has
been substantially incorporated into the statutes of various
States, and, by these, information obtained by any physician
or surgeon, while attending a patient, and necessary for his
proper treatment, and confessions made to a minister or
priest in his professional character, are also protected, and
cannot be given in evidence by either of them without the
consent of the patient or person confessing.
§ 2. The general rule on this subject, both at common law
and under statutes, may be stated as follows: All communi-
cations made to an attorney or counsellor-at-law, in the
course of any personal employment relating to the subject
thereof, and which are made in consequence of the relation
in which the parties stand to each other, and all communica-
tions made by a client to his attorney or counsel for the pur-
pose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged and
protected from disclosure, whether they relate to a suit
pending or contemplated, or to any other matter necessary or
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proper for such advice or aid; and such attorney or coun-
sellor cannot be compelled, nor will he be permitted, to dis-
close such communications in evidence without the consent
of his client.
This general rule of evidence was grafted into the common
law of England at an early date, for we find it recognized in
a case in the reign of Elizabeth in the 16th century: Berd v.
Lovelace, Cary (Eng. Ch.), 88. And the general doctrine was
fully considered and illustrated in a subsequent, but early
case, in which Lord Chancellor BROUGHAM, assisted by con-
sultation with Lord LYNDHURST, TINDAL, C. J., and PARK, J.,
said: "This protection is not qualified by any proceedings
pending or in contemplation. If touching matters that come
within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they
receive a communication in their professiopal capacity, either
from a client, or on his account and for his benefit, in the
transaction of his business, or, which amounts to the same
thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their em-
ployment on his behalf, matters which they know only
through their professional relation to the client, they are not
only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to
withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the in-
formation or produce the papers in any court of law or
equity, either as party or witnesses:" G-reenough v. Gaskell
(1833), 1 My. & K. 101.
These general principles of the law have been fortified and
sustained by many decisions, both English and American,
whether a suit was pending, or contemplated, or not, Bacon v.
.risbie (1880), 80 N. Y. 394; provided it is made for the pur-
pose of obtaining professional advice, Flack's Adm. v. _Neill
(1862), 26 Tex. 273; Parker v. Carter (1814), 4 Munf. (Va.) 273;
Hatton v. Robinson (1833), 14 Pick. (Mass.) 416; MeLellan v.
Longfellow (1851), 32 Me. 496; Dunn v. Amos (1861), 14 Wise.
115; Wetherbee v. Ezekiel (1852), 25 Vt. 47; Alderman v.
The People (1857), 4 Mich. 414; Parkhurst v. McGraw
(1852), 24 Miss. 134; Young v. Georgia (1880), 65 Ga. 525.
As to the ownership of the note in suit, Miller v. Weeks
(1853), 22 Pa. 89; Beltzhoover v. Blackstock (1834), 3 Watts
(Pa.) 21. Whether difficulty in granting a second lease
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was suggested by counsel or client, Turton v. Barber (1874),
17 L. R. Eq. 329 ; or, in fact, anything passing between
counsel and client during consultation, Bi ler v. Beyher (1873),
43 Ind. 112; and even if the retainer or employment is de-
clined, Crisler v. Garland (1848), 11 Sm. & Marsh. 136. As
to correspondence between solicitor preparing to commence
an action and third parties, M'Corquodale v. Bell (1876), 45
L. J. 0. P. Div. 329. As to correspondence between solicitor
and employes, Wilson v. Northampton and Banbury Junction
Bwy. Co. (1872), 14 L. R. Eq. 477; Macfarlan v. Holt (1872),
Id. 580. As to confidential correspondence with predecessors
in title and their solicitors, Minet v. Morgan (1873), 8 L. R.
Ch. App. 361; Mostyn v. W. Mostyn C. . I Co. Lmtd., (1876),
34 L. T. (N. S.) C. P. Div. 531.
It is not essential that any fee or compensation be actually
paid, or that there should be a general retainer: Bacon v
_risbie, supra; Earle v. Grout (1873), 46 Vt. 113; Cross v
.Riggins (1872), 50 Mo. 335.
It is not sufficient that the witness is ready and willing to
testify as to confidential communications which are privileged.
They are protected as a rule of law, and the Courts will in-
terpose and determine from the facts whether the witness was
acting in a professional capacity when the communications
were made: Bank of Utica v. Mersereau (1848), 3 Barb. Chan.
528; Bacon v. Frisbie, supra; -Foster v. Hall (1831), 12
Pick. (Mass.) 89; People v. Atkinson (1870), 40 Cal. 284.
An attorney cannot be compelled or allowed to testify as
to communications made to him by two clients in a suit by a
stranger against one or both of them without the consent of
both: post, § 7; Whiting v. Barney (1862), 38 Barb. (N. Y.)
397. Nor will he be permitted, on a bill of discovery, to
disclose communications of his clients, nor produce letters
passing between them, or through intermediate agents, and
containing or asking legal advice: Mitchell's Case (1861), 12
Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 259.
Counsel may be compelled to disclose the existence of the pro-
fessional relation, Chirac v. Beinicker (1826), 11 Wheat. (U. S.)
280; and the abstract legal opinion asked where no com-
munication of facts to be concealed was made, McMannus v.
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State (1858), 2 Head, 213; and what occurred in his presence,
as the execution of a document, although he was present in
consequence of his engagement as counsel: Patten v. Moore
(1854), 29 N. H. 163.
Friendly and confidential, but not professional, communica-
tions to a lawyer are not privileged: Branden v. Gowing
(1854), 7 Rich. Law (S. C.) 459.
§ 3. Other persons are privileged.-The rule is not limited
to the attorney or counsellor, but extends to his clerk, assist-
ant attorney, or other agent, while in the discharge of his
duty; and it covers confidential communications made to him,
or in his presence or hearing, if made for the purpose of ad-
vice or assistance, by the client of the attorney or counsellor,
as where it is made to an attorney's clerk to enable him to
prepare a complaint or other paper: Landsberger v. Gorham
(1855), 5 Cal. 450; Taylor v. Foster (1825), 2 C. & P. 195;
Port v. Bayne (1824), 1 Id. 545 ; Jackson v. French (1829), 3
Wend. (N. Y.) 337; Brand v. Brand (1870), 39 How. Pr. (N.
Y.) 193.
So the rule extends to a necessary interpreter, employed to
translate communications between the clieni4 and the attorney
or his assistants: Jackson v. French, supra ; Parker v. Carter,
supra; Andrews v. Solomon (1816), 1 Pet. C. C. 356.
The rule is limited to those who are in fact attorneys or
counsellors-at-law, and their clerks or assistants, and does not
extend to those who chance to be present at a conference be-
tween a client and his attorney: Jackson v. French, supra.
Nor does it protect communications overheard by a clerk in
the office, who does business for himself, or by others who may
by chance be in the vicinity: Id.; Barnes v. Harris (1851),
7 Cush. (Mass.) 574; Hoy v. Morris (1859), 13 Gray (Mass.),
519; Holmes v. Kimball (1850), 22 Vt. 555; Goddard v. Gard-
ner (1859), 28 Conn. 172; Sample v. Frost (1859), 10 Ia. 266.
Nor those made when both parties are present: Whitney v.
Barney (1864), 30 N. Y. 300; Britton v. Lorenz (1871), 45
N. T. 51; Gas Stove Co.'s Appeal (1888), 117 Pa. 514; nor
statements made by a third person to an attorney at the re-
quest of his client: Perkins v. Guy (1877), 55 Miss. 153.
Communications made by a former client after the relation
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of client and attorney has ceased are not privileged unless arti-
fice has been used to obtain them: Gordon v. Hess (1816), 18
Johns. (1. Y.) 492 ; Maudeville v. Gurnsey (1862), 88 Barb. (N.
Y.) 225; Williams v. Ben ton (1857), 12 La. An 91. Nor infor-
mation obtained from other sources, though the client may
have communicated the same to the attorney: Brandt v. Klein
(1820), 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 885 ; Crosby v. Berger (1844), 11 Paige
(N. Y.), 877; Chillicothe, etc., B. Co. v. Jameson (1868), 48 Ill. 281.
Nor acts nor transactions of a client with third persons or with
an adverse party, though the attorney may be professionally
engaged therein: Coveny v. Tannahill (1841), 1 Hill (N. Y.),
88; Iebbard v. Haughian (1877), 70 N. Y. 54; -Randel v.
Yates (1873), 48 Miss. 685. Nor letters written by an attor-
ney pursuant to instructions of his client: Beg. v. Do,.ner
(1880), 43 L. T. N. S. 445. Nor statements made by a client
to a-third person in the presence of his attorney: Satterlee v.
Bliss (1869), 86 Cal. 487; Gallagher v. Williamson (1863),
23 Id. 831; Patten v. Moor (1854), 29 N. H. 163; Beeson v.
Beeson (1848), 9 Pa. 279. Nor communications made by a
client which have no relation to the advice or aid sought or
obtained by him: Ante, § 2; State v. Mewherter (1877), 46 Ia.
88; Foster v. Hall, supra. Nor communications made to one
who is supposed to be an attorney, but who is not: Fountain
v. Young (1807), 6 Esp. 113; see, also, Rochester City Bk. v.
Suydam (1851), 5 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 254; Foster v. Hall, supra.
Generally the rule does not apply to communications made
between parties to a controversy before an attorney solicited
by them to draw up papers or agreements in relation to the
matter, or where they relate to agreements made between
such parties and the attorney of one of them, or where made
by one party to his counsel in the presence of the other party
or his attorney, or where made by one party or his attorney
to the attorney of the other: Gore v. Harris (1851), 8 Eng.
L. & E. 147; McLean v. Clark (1872), 47 Ga. 24; -Parish v.
Gates (1856), 29 Ala. 254; Pulford's Appeal (1880), 48 Conn.
247; .Dunn v. Amos (1861), 14 Wis. 106; Gas Stove, etc., Co.'s
Appeal (1888), 117 Pa. 514; Root v. Wright (1880), 21 Hun
(N. Y.), 844; Britton v. Lorenz (1871), 45 N. Y. 57; Hubbard v.
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Haughian (1877), 70 N. Y. 61; House v. Rouse (1886), 61
Mich. 69.
Communications are not privileged when made by one who
is merely a nominal party to a suit, and who has no real in-
terest in it, or made to counsel after he has refused to act as
such for the party making it, or to an attorney who has a
personal interest in the matter to which the communication
relates, or where the matter of the communication becomes
necessary to be shown to protect the personal rights of the
attorney: Allen v. Harrison (1888), 30 Vt. 219; Rochester
City Bk. v. Suydam (1851), 5 How. (N. Y.) 254; Setzar v.
Wilson (1844), 4 Ired. L. 501.
The rule is held not to apply to an attorney who is called
upon merely to perform some manual service, as to draw up
a written instrument, according to directions, without a re-
quest to give any legal advice or assistance, and without giving
any: Hatton v. Robinson (1833), 14 Pick. (Mass.) 416; Alden
v.Goddard (1882), 73 Me. 345 ; Borum v. Fouts (1860), 15 Ind.
50 ; Randel v. Yates (1873), 48 Miss. 685 ; De Wolf v. Strader
(1861), 26 Ill. 225. Nor does the rule prevent a scrivener,
who drew a will, from testifying as to the reasons and pur-
poses of the testator in making certain bequests: Sanford v.
Sanford (1872), 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 805 ; S. C. 5 Lans. (N. Y.)
486; Russell v. Jackson (1851), 15 Jur. 1117; see, also, Matter
of Austin (1886), 42 Hun (N. Y.), 516; Matter of Boury (1887),
8 N. Y. 809. And generally the rule applies only to such
matters as the attorney has learned from his client or on his
client's behalf, and which were committed to him in the
capacity of an attorney, and in which capacity only he re-
ceived them: Rex v. Brewer (1834), 6 C. & P. 363; Annesley
v. Anglesea (1743), 17 How. St. Tr. 1239; Gillard v. Bates
(1840), 6 M. & W. 547; Greenough v. Gaskell (1833), 1 My.
& K. 104; Walsingham v. Goodricke (1843), 8 Hare, 122;
Whiting v. Barney (1864), 30 N. Y. 330.
§ 4. The rule covers all, methods of communication.-The
general rule covers all methods of communication and all
sources of information, oral or otherwise, such as deeds and-
other papers, and paintings, pictures, photographs, weapons,
and other instruments and mechanical devices, if they are
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used to convey to the attorney information necessary or use-
ful in the discharge of his professional duty to his client:
Kellogg v. Kellogg, supra ; Crosby v. Berger, supra; Durkee v.
Leonard (1882), 4 Vt. 612; Anon. (1811), 8 Mass. 370; Lynde
v. Judd (1807), 8 Day (Conn.), 499 ; Mills v. Oddy (1834), 6
C. & P. 728. And in such a case the contents of the deed or
other document or instrument of writing would be pro-
tected by the general rule and the statute: (Genet v. Ketchum
(1875), 62 N. Y. 626; Parker v. Carter (1814), supra.
§ 5. The privilege may be waived.-At common law, as well
as under the statutes, the protection continues forever, unless
waived by the client. Even his death is not a waiver of it:
Ratton v. Robinson (1838), 14 Pick. (Mass.) 416; Bank of Utica
v. Mercereau (1848), 8 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528 ; Yordan v. Hess
(1816), 13 Johns. (N. Y) 492; Chase's Case (1827), 1 Bland's Ch.
(Md.) 206. As to waiver of the statutory protection of the "in-
formation," acquired by a physician or surgeon while attending
a patient, see post, § 14. It has been held that if a party to an
action offers himself as a witness on the trial, this gives the ad-
verse party a right to cross-examine him as to any confidential
communication made to his attorney: Inhabitants of Woburn
v. Henshaw (1869), 101 Mass. 198; Com. v. lullen (1867), 97
Id. 545. But, unless the party in such a case gave some evi-
dence relating to such communication on his examination in
chief, the weight of authority would seem to be against the
waiver in such a case: .Duttenhofer v. State (1877), 84 Ohio
St. 91 ; State v. White (1877), 19 Kans. 445 ; Bigler v. Reyher
(1873), 43 Ind. 112; Barker v. Kuhn (1874), 88 Ia. 895 ; Boba
v. Bryson (1860), 21 Ark. 887; HLemenway v. Smith (1856),
28 Vt. 701.
§ 6. Unanimous consent required to waive where several com-
munioatejointly.-If the communication is made by or on be-
half of two or more parties, in reference to a matter of joint
interest or concern, the obligation of secrecy can only be re-
moved by the concurrence of all the parties concerned, and
one or more cannot permit or require a disclosure of such
privileged communications as evidence, without the consent.
of all. The seal of secrecy can only be removed by unanimous
consent: Whitney v. Barney (1862), 88 Barb. (N. Y.) 397; Boot
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v. Wright (1881), 84 N. Y. 72; Chahoon v. Com. (1871), 21
Gratt. (Va.) 822; .Robson v. Kemp (1803), 4 Esp. 233; 5 Id.
52; 9trode v. Seaton (1834), 2 Al. & El. 171; .TcLellan v.
Longfellow (1851), 32 Me. 494; .Bank of Utica v. Mersereau,
supra. Unless a controversy arise bstween the clients, Rice
v. Rice (1854), 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 417; because then the com-
munications are made in the presence of all the parties to the
controversy: Britton v. Lorenz (1871), 45 N. Y. 57.
§ 7. Does not apply where advice is sought to aid commission
of crime.-Confidential communications made by a person to
an attorney, with the view of obtaining advice or assistance
in t'he commission of a crime, are not protected, and the at-
torney may be required to disclose such communications:
People v. Blakeley (1859), 4 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 176; People v.
Sheriff (1859), 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 622; Graham v. People (1872),
63 Id. 483; (oveney v. Tannahill, supra; S. 0. 37 Am. Dec.
287; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, supra; State v. Mewherter
(1877), 46 Ia. 88; Orman v. State (1887), 22 Tex. 604; Queen
v. Cox (1884), 14 Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 158; 15 Cox Cr. Cas.
611 ; 5 Am. Cr. R. 140 ; Rex v. Dixon (1765), 3 Burr. (N.
Y.) 1687; Anon. (1811), 8 Mass. 370. But the privilege
does extend to communications made for the purpose of ob-
taining information and advice in the perpetration of a
wrongful act not criminal per se, as where it consists of a
fraud on creditors: Gartside v. Outram (1857, 26 L. J. Ch.
115; Charlton v. Coombes (1863), 32 Id. 284; JZlaxham v.
Ptace (1874), 46 Vt. 434; Peck v. Williams (1861), 13 Abb.
Pr. 71.
The attorney may be required to testify as to his custody of
a written instrument, in order to lay the foundation fbr sec-
ondary evidence of its contents: Jilitchedl's Case (1861), 12
Abb. Pr. 259. And as to the date of a written instrument
prepared by him, and whether it has been ante-dated or al-
tered, or as to the date of its actual delivery, but not as to
the object of its execution or the subject-matter of its execu-
tion: Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, supra; Coveney v. Tanna-
hill, supra.
Where the same attorney acted for a mortgagee in lending
money, and also for the mortgagor in preparing the mortgage
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deed, and in doing so received a forged will from the mort-
gagor as a part of his title-deeds, on a trial of the latter for the
forgery, it was held that the forged will was not a privileged
communication, and the attorney was required to produce it:
Reg. v. Avery (1838), 8 C. & P. 596. And where the attorney
for the plaintiff wrote a letter for the defendant to a third
person about the matter afterwards in suit, the communica-
tion was not privileged: Shore v. Bedford (1843), 5 Man. &
Gr. 271.
IL TO PHYSICIANS.
8. Information acquired by a physician or surgeon, when
protected.-At common law confidential communications by a
patient to his physician or surgeon, however necessary they
might be to enable him to act in a professional capacity, were
not privileged or protected from disclosure on the witness-
stand. But by statutes in various States all communications
made by a patient to his physician or surgeon, and all rnfor-
mation acquired by him while attending a patient in a pro-
fessional capacity, which was important to enable him so to
act, are protected. And under these statutes, the general
principles of construction, and doctrines deducible therefrom,
would be the same as under the common-law rule of protec-
tion of confidential communications made to an attorney in
his professional capacity.
§ 9. The statutes on the subject are given at the close of
this article.
§ 10. The statutes protect all information acquired by a phy-
sician or surgeon.-It will be observed that the statutory pro-
visions relating to physicians and surgeons are broader than
those relating to attorneys and counsellors-at-law. The phy-
sician's knowledge may be acquired from the patient himself,
from the statements of others who may surround the patient
at the time, or from observation of his appearance and symp-
toms: Edington v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1876), 67 N. Y. 185;
Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co. (1877), 69 Id. 256; Briggs.v.
.Briggs (1870), 20 Mich. 34; Gartside v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins.
Co. (1882), 76 Mo. 446; Grattan v. Met. L. Ins. Co. (1880),
80 N. Y. 281; Campau v. Nforth (1878), 39 Mich. 606. The
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statutes do not apply to one who is not licensed as a physi-
cian or surgeon: Wiel v. Cowles (1887), 45 Hun (N. Y.), 307;
People v. Schuyler (1887), 43 Id. 88 ; 1Renikan v. Dennin (1886),
103 N. Y. 573. Nor do they apply to "information" acquired
by a physician, if it was not obtained while he was acting
in his professional character and the relation of physician
and patient in fact existed. Thus, where a physician of a
jail, where a prisoner charged with crime was confined, had
medical charge of all the prisoners, and the defendant was
examined by him at the request of both parties, it was held
proper for him to testify as to the defendant's sanity: People
v. Schuyler (1887), 106 N. Y. 298.
§ 11. Construction of the statutes.-Some controversy has
arisen in reference to what is required to be shown as to the
importance or necessity of the information, in order to pro-
tect it, and how and when this should be made to appear.
It seems generally conceded that the word "necessary," as
used in the statutes, was not used in its strict sense of abso
lute necessity, but was intended to cover all useful and con-
venient information for the purpose of proper professional
treatment of the patient. It has been said that the plain
language of the statute should not be made broader by con-
struction, and that the necessity of the "information" ac-
quired by the physician should be made clearly to appear be.
fore evidence thereof is excluded: See EARLE, J., in Mdingto
v. Altna Ins. Co. (1879), 77 N. Y. 564; Campau v. North
(1878), 89 Mich. 606. On the other hand, it seems that the
necessity of the "information" has been inferred from the
relation of patient and physician and the character of the
information: Edington v. Met. L. rns. Co. (1876), 67 N. Y.
185. Thus, where the action was brought to recover damages
for injuries sustained by negligence of the defendant, and the
plaintiff called the physician who treated him for his in-
juries, to prove expenses incurred by such treatment as an
element of damages, and upon cross-examination he was
asked, if the plaintiff had the venereal disease while under
his care as a physician, to which the plaintiff objected as
calling for privileged "information," it was held that the
question implied that, if the witness .acquired any. information.
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on the subject, he obtained it in a professional way, and that
it was protected by the statute: Sloan v. New York Cent. R.
Co. (1871), 45 N. Y. 125; Gratton v. Met. L. Ins. Co. (1880),
80 Id. 281. A physician's certificate, given in good faith,
that another person is insane, would be privileged in an action
against him for libel therefor, if the certificate was given in a
legal proceeding under a statute: -Perkins v. Mitchell (1860),
31 Barb. (N. Y.) 461. But if the statement in any such case
is false in fact and malicious in motive, the injured party may
recover: Somerville v. Hawkins (1850), 3 Eng. L. & E. 503;
Harrison v. _Bush (1855), 32 Id. 173; Thorn v. Blanchard
(1809), 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 508; O'Donaghue v. -fcGovern
(1840), 23 Wend. (N. Y) 26; Van Wyck v. Aspinwall (1858),
17 N. Y. 190; White v. Nicholls (1845), 3 How. (U. S.) 266.
§ 12. Information not necessary not protected.-The statutes
protect "information" that is "necessary," or valuable or
useful, to the physician or surgeon to prescribe or act in a
professional way and no other. As to any information, there-
fore, which has no relation to the treatment of the patient,
the physician or surgeon may be required to testify, and
neither the patient nor other person can object on the ground
that it is within the statute. Thus, it has been held that a
physician may testify to an admission made by his patient
during treatment, that the injury which ha was called upon
to treat him for existed before the time of the alleged injury,
for which an action for damages was brought, unless it
appears affirmatively that such information was essential for
a proper treatment: Campau v. North, supra; Brown v. Rome
W. -0. B. Co. (1887), 45 Hun (N. Y.), 439; Reniham v.
.Dennin, supra ; Edington v. .,Mtna L. Ins. Co., supra. And
information obtained from a person who consults with a phy-
sician or surgeon for the purpose of getting advice or direc-
tion how to perpetrate a crime, would not be protected by the
statute, for the. reason that the relation of patient and phy-
sician or surgeon would not exist for the purposes required,
and the information would not be "necessary" for any treat-
ment of the patient. Thus, where a physician was consulted
by a person as to the means of procuring an abortion in an
action for seduction against the latter, it was held that the
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information acquired by the physician from the defendant
was not within the protection of the statute, and that he was
competent to testify thereto: .Hewett v. Prime (1839), 21
Wend. (N. Y.) 79. See, also, ante, § 7; post, § 14.
In case of a conspiracy between a physician and his patient
to commit a crime, neither could shield himself under the
statute: Ante, § 8; People v. Sheriff (1859), 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 622.
§ 13. Waiver of protection; who may waive it.-The object
of the statutes is to secure the confidence of the patient in
disclosing whatever may be of importance to the physician
or surgeon, and in furnishing all means and sources of infor-
mation which may contribute to aid him in his professional
investigations and duties, and, to accomplish this, such infor-
mation is protected from disclosure. The protection is per-
sonal to the patient; and being so, the patient might waive
the privilege on general principles of the law. But the
statutes of various States expressly provide for such waivers.
See the statutes in the note, infra. No physician or surgeon
can give evidence of the protected "information," unless the
protection is expressly waived by the patient. Even the
death of the patient will not remove the seal of secrecy:
Westover v. iEtna L. Ins. Co. (1885), 99 N. Y. 56; Grattan v.
Met. L. ins. Co., supra. Without a waiver the evidence
would be incompetent, as it is prohibited by the statutes.
And unless offered by the patient, would be open to the
objection of any person interested: Cahen v. Cont. L. Ins. Co.
(1876), 41 N. Y. Super. Ct. 296; Johnson v. Jo/Apson (1834),
4 Paige (N. Y.), 460; People v. Stout (1858), 3 Park. Cr. R.
670; Edington v. Met. L. Ins. Co., supra; People v. Murphy
(1886), 101 N. Y. 126. It has, however, been held that the
prohibited "information" of a physician or surgeon must be
disclosed, when it is called for, either by the patient, or, in
case of his death, by his representative. And this, because
the object of the statute is to protect the patient: Scripps v.
Foster (1879), 41 Mich. 742; G. 1?. . I B. Co. v. Martin
(1879), Id. 667; Harriman v. Stowe (1874), 57 Mo. 93; Pier-
son v. People (1880), 79 N. Y. 424; Fay v. Harlan (1880), 128
Mass. 244; Quaffe et ux. v. C. & N. R. Co. (1879), 48 Wise.
514; 1//. C. B. Co. v. Sutton (1867), 42 Ill. 438.
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Thus, where an action was brought by the widow to recover
damages for the death of her husband, caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant, the testimony of the attending phy-
sician of the deceased, who treated him for the injury, as to
"information" obtained while thus treating him, was held
proper on her behalf: Groll v. Tower (1884), 85 Mo. 249.
But the physician cannot give evidence of such "informa-
tion" against the objection of either the patient or his repre-
sentatives. Thus, where an action was brought by a widow
to recover on a policy of insurance on the life of her deceased
husband, and the defendant offered to prove by the physician
who attended him at the time that the deceased had the de-
lirium tremens, an objection thereto was held properly sus-
tained: Gartside v. Conn. .Mut. Ins. Co. (1882), 76 Mo. 446.
It has been held in New York that, although the represen-
tative of a deceased person may claim the benefit of the
statutory protection, he cannot waive it; that it would be the
same with respect to confessions and communications to a
minister or attorney. Thus, where an action in that State was
brought upon a life-insurance policy issued to the plaintiff's
testator, which provided that it should be void, if the insured
should commit suicide; and he did commit suicide by hang-
ing himself. The plaintiff claimed that the deceased was in-
sane at the time, and, to sustain this, called a physician who
had attended him a short time before his death. This was
objected to by the defendant as incompetent under the statute,
and on appeal the objection was sustained: 'restover v. .Etna
L. Ins. Co. (1885), 99 N. Y. 56; .Edington v. Met. L. Ins.
Co. (1876), 67 N. Y. 185; S. C., supra; Grattan v. Met. L.
Ins. Co. (1880), 80 Id. 281; Bowman v. Norton, 5 C. & P.
177; Pierson v. People, supra; Staunton v. Parker (1879), 19
Hun (JN. Y.), 55. If the patient calls the physician and
examines him in chief as to the privileged matter, this is
held to be a waiver, so as to permit the adverse party to
examine him in relation thereto at any subsequent trial of
the action: lBeniham v. Dennin, supra ; De Witt v. Barley
(1853), 9 N. Y. 371; McKinney v. Grand St., etc., R. Co.
(1887), 104 Id. 852; People v. Barker (1886), 60 Mich. 277.
But the use of one physician's evidence in such a case would
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not constitute a waiver of protection as to the "information"
of other physicians: Rope v. 7Toy t. Lans. B. Go. (1886), 40
-Hun (N. Y.), 438; Westover v..MFtna.L. Ins.o., 8upra. The pa-
tient's attorney may, on behalf of the patient, waive the privi-
lege: Alberti v. New York, etc., R.Co. (1887), 43 Hun (N. Y.), 421.
§ 14. Exception in criminal cases.-The protection afforded
to "information" obtained by a physician or surgeon covers
all cases where he may be called as a witness, which would
include criminal as well as civil cases, notwithstanding the
purposes of justice in some cases would seem to demand an
exception to the rule. But in a recent criminal case the stat-
ute was so construed as not to apply to the peculiar circum-
stances of it. The defendant was indicted and tried for
murder by poisoning the deceased. The testimony of the
physician who attended and treated him as to "information"
obtained while he was his patient, and in reference to his
symptoms and the cause of his death, was competent evi-
dence. This decision is placed on the ground that the privilege
of suppressing such information is personal, to prevent the
abuse of the confidential relation between the patient and his
physician, and -for the benefit of the former, and that, when
there is no desire or object for suppressing it, on the part of
the patient or others personally interested on his behalf, and
criminal justice demands it, it is competent evidence: Pierson
v. People (1879), 18 Hun (N. Y.), 249; (1880), 79 N. Y. 424.
See, also, Grand Rapids d. Ind. B. Co. v. Martin, Scripps v.
Foster, and Edington v. Met. L. Ins. Co., supra; People v.
Murphy (1885), 3 N. Y. Crim. R. 838.
"Information" obtained from a person who consults a phy-
sician as to the mode of producing an abortion, contrary to
law, is not protected by the statute: Hewitt v. Prime (1889),
21 Wend. (N. Y.) 79; Ante, § 7. So it has been held that,
as the protection is personal to the patient, a person charged
with murder cannot object to the testimony of the physician
who attended his victim: Pierson v. People, supra. See, also,
ante, § 7. The statute in that case was construed as a shield
to the patient and not to the guilty.
§ 15. Protection of "information" extends to a physician's
assistants.-A reasonable construction of the statutes would
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extend it to protect "information" obtained by those who
may be called in to consult with the patient's regular physi-
cian or surgeon, and to such other persons as may be required
to assist him in the discharge of his professional duty. The
rule in this respect should be the same as in case of protected
communications by a client to his attorney: See ante, § 3;
.Reniham v. Dennin, supra.
III. TO CLERGYMEN.
§ 16. Confessions to clergymen not protected at common law.-
At common law a confession made to a clergyman or priest is
not protected, and he may be required to testify to it as a
witness in any civil or criminal proceeding, although it has
been said that the law of England encourages the penitent to
confess his sins, "for the unburthening of his conscience, and
to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind." The law
iu this respect was, perhaps, generally regarded as unjust and
against public policy, and it was urged that such communi-
cations should be protected in the interests of religion, so
"that the guilty conscience may with safety disburden itself
by penitential confessions, and by spiritual advice, instruc-
tion, and discipline seek pardon and relief."
§ 17. &rotected by statutes.-In accordance with the public
sentiment and policy referred to, there have been enacted in
various States statutes protecting confessions made to priests
and clergymen in their professional character: the statutes
are given in full at the close of this article.
§ 18. Conditions of protection.-In order that a confession
may be protected under the New York and other similar
statutes, it is essential that the person to whom the confession
is made be a clergyman or minister, and that it be made to
him in his professional character. If not so made, it would
not be protected: People v. Gates (1835), 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 811.
The minister or priest must be one in fact. One appointed to
such an office, in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the religious organization or body to which he belongs, and
exercising the functions of the office, would come within the
statute. But it is probable that this would not be required
in all cases. It will be observed that the statute in respect to
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clergymen is not so specific as it is in respect to attorneys and
physicians. We have observed that the statutes provide
that confidential communications made by a client to "an
attorney or counsellor-at-law" are protected, and that they
mean such persons as are legally vuthorized to practise as
such: Ante, §§ 1, 2, 3. The statutes on this subject relating
to physicians and surgeons embrace only those who are
"duly authorized to practise physic or surgery:" Ante, § 10.
Those under consideration embrace "clergymen or other
ministers of any religion." It is quite probable that this
would be regarded as covering all who act in that capacity,
and one recognized as such by any religious body or class of
people, even though they may be, comparatively speaking,
insignificant. G. W. FIELD.
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
Arizona Revised Statutes of 1887, p. 818, provide that
in criminal proceedings-
§ 2039. 2. An attorney or counsellor shall not, without the consent of his
client, be examined as a witness as to any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon, in the course of professional employment.
3. A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent of the person making
the confession, be examined as a witness as to any confession made to him in
his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the church
to which he belongs.
In civil actions, the Compiled Laws of 1877, pp. 469, 470,
included the above provisions, and also a similar provision
for "licensed physicians or surgeons," but these provisions
were repealed by the Revised Statutes, and in lieu, "the com-
mon law of England as now practised and understood," was
restored: § 1862, title xxv., ch. 4, see. 38.
Arkansas Digest of Statutes, 1883, p. 625, gives the follow-
ing laws-
§ 2859. The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:
* * * * Fifth. An attorney, concerning any communication made to him by
his client in that relation, or his advice thereon, without the client's consent.
§ 2861. No minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination shall be
compelled to testify in relation to any confession made to him in his profes-
sional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules, or practice of
such denomination.
STATUTES.
§ 2862. No person authorized to practise physic or surgery shall be com-
pelled to disclose any information which he may have acquired from his patient
while attending him in a professional character, and which information was
necessary to enable him to prescribe as a physician or do any act for him as a
surgeon.
California Code of Civil Procedure, 1885, § 1881, declares,
as to attorneys and clergymen, in identical words with the
Arizona statute above cited, save the words "as a witness,"
and "cannot" for "shall not," and proceeds-
4. A licensed physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his
patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in at-
tending the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for
the patient.
The same rules apply to criminal cases: Penal Code, § 1102.
Colorado General Statutes, 1883, pp. 1062-3, provide-
§ 9. 2. An attorney shall not, without the consent of his client, be exam-
ined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon, in the course of professional employment.
3. A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent of the person
making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to him in his
professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs.
4. A physician or surgeon duly authorized to practise his profession under
the laws of this State shall' not, without the consent of his patient, be exam-
ined as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was neces-
sary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient.
Dakota Compiled Laws, 1887, p. 910, § 5313, literally
the same as the Colorado statute, except "cannot" is substi-
tuted for "shall not," and the words "duly authorized to
practise his profession under the laws of this State," are
omitted, thus agreeing with the statutes of Arizona and Cali-
fornia.
Georgia Code, 1882, p. 987, provides-
§ 3797. There are certain admissions and communications excluded from
public policy. Among these are * * * * 2. Between attorney and
client. * * * *
§ 3798. Communications to any attorney or his clerk, to be transmitted to
the attorney pending his employment, or in anticipation thereof, shall never
be heard by the Court. So the attorney cannot be compelled to disclose the
advice or counsel he may give to his client, nor to produce or deliver up the
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title-deeds or other papers, except evidences of debt left in his possession by
his client. This rule does not exclude the attorney as a witness to any facts
which may transpire in connection with his employment.
Idaho Revised Statutes, 1887, p. 679, literally the same as
the California statute, except the word "licensed" is omitted.
Indiana Revised Statutes, 1881 (edition of 1888 embracing
all general laws subsequent to the revision), provide in crimi-
nal cases (§ 1796) and also in civil-
§ 497. The following persons shall not be competent witnesses:-
Third. Attorneys, as to confidential communications made to them in the
course of their professional business and as to advice given in such cases.
Fourth. Physicians, as- to matter communicated to them as such by patients
in the course of their professional business or advice given in such cases.
Fifth. Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made to them in course of
discipline enjoined by their respective churches.
Iowa Revised Code, 1884, p. 860, provides-
§ 3643. No practising attorney, counsellor, physician, surgeon, minister of
the gospel, or priest of any denomination, shall be allowed in giving testimony
to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the
functions of his office according to the usual course of practice or discipline.
Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the party in whose favor the
same are made waives the rights conferred.
Kansas Compiled Laws, 1885, p. 645, provide-
(4133) § 323. The following persons shall be incompetent to testify:-
Fourth. An attorney, concerning any communications made to him by his
client, in that relation, or his advice thereon, without the client's consent.
Fifth. A clergyman or priest, concerning any confession made to him in his
professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to
which he belongs, without the consent of the person making the confession.
Sixth. A physician or surgeon, concerning any communication made to him
by his patient, with reference to any physical or supposed physical disease, or
any knowledge obtained by a personal examination of any such patient: -
vided, That if a person offer himself as a witness, that is to be deemed a con-
sent to the examination; also, if an attorney, clergyman or priest, physician
or surgeon, on the same subject, within the meaning of the last three sub-
divisions of this section (sic).
Michigan General Statutes, 1882, pp. 1889-90, provide-
§ 7515. Sec. 85. Chap. 262. No minister of the gospel, or priest of any de-
nomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to
him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the
rules or practice of such denomination.
STATUTE.
§ 7516. Sec. 86. No person duly authorized to practise physic or surgery
shall be allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired in
attending any patient, in his professional character, and which information
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician or to
do any act for him as a surgeon.
Minnesota General Statutes, 1881, p. 792, chap. 73, title 1,
§ 10, literally the same as the California statute, except "a
regular physician or surgeon" is used in place of "a licensed,"
etc.
Missouri Revised Statutes, 1879, p. 690, declare-
§ 4017. The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: ****
third, an attorney, concerning any communication made to him by his client
in that relation, or his advice thereon, without the consent of such client;
fourth, a minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination, concerning a
confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination; fifth, a physician or
surgeon, concerning any information which he may have acquired from any
patient while attending him in a professional character, and which information
was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient & a physician, or
do any act for him as a surgeon.
Montana Compiled Statutes, 1887, p. 230, Civil Code,
§ 650, provide in the same words as the California statute,
supra. These provisions are applicable to criminal trials: Id.
p. 459, Criminal Code, § 294.
Nebraska Compiled Statutes, 1885, provide--
Sec. 328. Every human being of sufficient capacity to understand the obliga-
tion of an oath, is a competent witness in all cases, civil and criminal, except
as otherwise herein declared. The following persons shall be incompetent to
testify: * * * * Fourth. An attorney, concerning any communication made to
him by his client in that relation, or his advice thereon, without the client's
consent in open Court or in writing produced in Court. Fkfth. A clergyman or
priest, concerning any confession made to him in his professional character, in
the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs, without
the consent of the person making the confession.
Nevada General Statutes, 1885, p. 883, provide-
§ 3404. Sec. 382. An attorney or counsellor shall not, without the consent
of his client, be examined as a witness as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the course of professional em-
ployment.
§ 3405. Sec. 383. A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent of
the person making the confession, be examined as a witness as to any confes-
sion made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline en-
joined by the church to which he belongs.
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§ 3406. Seo. 384. A licensed physician or surgeon shall not, without the
consent of his patient, be examined as a witness as to any infomation c-
quired in attending the patient, which was ndessary to enable him to prescribe
or act for the patient: Provided, however, in any suit or prosecution against a
physician or surgeon for malpractice, if the pat..ent or party suing or prose-
outing shall require or give such consent, and any such witness shall give
testimony, then such physician or surgeon, defendant, may call any other
physicians or surgeons, as witnesses on behalf of defendant, without the con-
sent of such patient or party suing or prosecuting.
New York Code of Civil Procedure (4 Rev. Stat. 1882, p.
164) declares:
§ 833. A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed
to disclose a confession made to him, in his professional character, in the course
of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religions body to which
he belongs.
§ 834. A person duly authorized to practise physic or surgery shall not be
allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient,
in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity.
§ 835. An attorney or counsellor-at-law shall not be allowed to disclose a
communication made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the
course of his professional employment.
§ 836. The last three sections apply to every examination of a person as a
witness, unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived by the person con-
fessing, the patient or the client.
Ohio Revised Statutes, 1884, p. 1096, provide-
§ 5241. The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:-
1. An attorney, concerning a communication made to him by his client in
that relation, or his advice to his client; or a physician, concerning a com-
munication made to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his
patient; but the attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the
client or patient; and if the client or patient voluntarily testify, the attorney
or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject.
2. A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession made to him in his pro-
fessional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
he belongs.
Oregon General Laws, 1872, p. 251, literally the same as
California, except "shall not" for "cannot."
Pennsylvania enacted, 1887 (P. L. 158, §§ 2, 5), that in
any civil or criminal proceeding before any tribunal-
(d) Nor shall counsel be competent or permitted to testify to confidential
communications made to him by his client, or the client be compelled to dis-
close the same, unless in either case this privilege be waived upon the trial by
the client.
STATUTES.
Tennessee Code, 1884, p. 897, declares--
§ 4748. No attorney or counsel shall be permitted, in giving testimony
against a client, or person who consulted him professionally, to disclose any
communication made to him as attorney by such person, during the pendency
of a suit, before or afterwards, to his injury.
§ 4750. Any attorney offering to give testimony in any of the cases provided
for in the two preceding sections shall be rejected by the Court, and is guilty
of a misdemeanor, for which, on conviction, he shall be fined not exceeding
one thousand dollars, to be assessed by the jury, and imprisoned not exceed-
ing two years, and if a practising attorney shall also be stricken from the
rolls.
Texas Revised Penal Code, 1888, p. 219, declares--
§ 2439. Art. 733. All other persons except those enumerated in articles
730 and 735, whatever may be the relationship between the defendant and
witness, are competent to testify, except an attorney-at-law shall not disclose
a communication made to him by his client during the existence of that rela-
tionship, nor disclose any other fact which came to the knowledge of such at-
torney by reason of such relationship.
Utah Compiled Laws, 1876, p. 506, literally the same as
the Nevada statute, supra.
Washington Territory Code, 1881, p. 102, provides-
Sec. 392. The following persons shall not be examined as witnesses: (then
clauses 2, 3, and 4, literally as the California statute, except the words "shall
not" for "cannot.")
Wisconsin Revised Statutes, 1878, p. 992, provide-
§ 4074. A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed
to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character, in the course
of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which
he belongs, without consent thereto by the party confessing.
§ 4075. No person duly authorized to practise physic or surgery shall be
compelled to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attend-
ing any patient in a professional character, and which information was neces-
sary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any
act for him as a surgeon.
§ 4076. An attorney or counsellor-at-law shall not be allowed to disclose a
communication made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the
course of his professional employment.
Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1887, p. 590, § 2589, literally
the same as the Ohio Statute, supra. JOHN B. UHLE.
